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4. Education in Plato’s Laws

Edited by Gregory Recco and Eric Sanday Indiana University Press ePub

4    Education in Plato’s Laws

John Russon

The basic story of Book 2 of Plato’s Laws is easy enough to tell. The Athenian Stranger, who is discussing the establishment of a good state with Cleinias the Knossian and Megillus the Spartan, argues for the primary importance of education and discusses the importance of song and dance in this context.1 Specifically, he maintains that children will have their adult perspectives formed through their early experiences of pleasure and pain, and that good education primarily involves training children to align their experiences of pleasure and pain with what wise adults would in fact recognize to be noble and ignoble behaviors respectively. Since children are playful by nature, it is through controlling their play that this education will be accomplished. Games, songs, and dances in particular are the structured forms of play in which children will participate in order to become educated into good citizenship (2.659e).2 The communal experience of song and dance, which is the focus of Book 2, will primarily be enacted through three choruses—a children’s chorus, led by the muses, a young men’s chorus led by Apollo, and a Dionysian chorus of adults, including especially old men (2.664c–d). It is the oldest men who, being wisest, will appreciate what the children should learn, and it is their insights—which should be the equivalent of the needs of virtue—that will determine the implicit content of the songs, dances, and games learned by the children (2.659d; 7.797a). The message being communicated will mostly express the importance of maintaining the existing social order, and its central message (its “noble lie,” so to speak—2.663d–e) will be the unity of justice and happiness (2.664b; also, 660e).

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12. Spacing the Hidden God: The Temporal/Spatial Divide

Marius Timmann Mjaaland Indiana University Press ePub

If this topos of a difference between the hidden and revealed god, as discussed by Luther in De servo arbitrio, is situated prior to temporal distinctions, it remains anachronistic in its relation to the chronology of history. It is, insofar as it “is,” older than beings and prior to their coming into existence. This anachronism or, rather, anachrony of the place would then be the premise for understanding its history and its genealogy. It remains non-contemporary with us and with itself.1 It will continuously escape our efforts at a temporal identification of it as belonging to a particular era or period. It cannot remain identical with itself in periods of shifting worldviews and changing conceptualities. When the concepts are changing, however, these concepts of change are measured by the difference rather than measuring this difference. Since this basic difference tends to be overlooked, and in particular by an era which identifies itself as “modern” or even “post-modern” as opposed to the ancient and medieval worlds, the effort to think this difference will take the form of a recollection, a rediscovery, in order to reverse the forgetfulness of modern human beings with their limited memory of ancient structures of thought.2

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23. The Architecture of Theories

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


The Architecture of Theories

30 August 1890

Morris Library

Of the fifty or hundred systems of philosophy that have been advanced at different times of the world’s history, perhaps the larger number have been, not so much results of historical evolution, as happy thoughts which have accidentally occurred to their authors. An idea which has been found interesting and fruitful has been adopted, developed, and forced to yield explanations of all sorts of phenomena. The

English have been particularly given to this way of philosophizing; witness, Hobbes, Hartley, Berkeley, James Mill. Nor has it been by any means useless labour; it shows us what the true nature and value of the ideas developed are, and in that way affords serviceable materials for philosophy. Just as if a man, being seized with the conviction that paper was a good material to make things of, were to go to work to build a papier mâché house, with roof of roofing-paper, foundations of pasteboard, windows of paraffined paper, chimneys, bath tubs, locks, etc., all of different forms of paper, his experiment would probably afford valuable lessons to builders, while it would certainly make a detestable house, so those one-idea’d philosophies are exceedingly interesting and instructive, and yet are quite unsound.

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2. Philosophy: The Grammar of Destruction

Marius Timmann Mjaaland Indiana University Press ePub

The destruction of metaphysics is a favored topic in twentieth-century philosophy, in terms of a positivist critique, an overcoming, an Abbau, a rejection, or a deconstruction of traditional metaphysical notions and concepts. But where and when does this discussion of a general destruction of metaphysics start? I argue that the Heidelberg Disputation plays a key role here.1 In this short disputation, Luther presents forty theses giving a principal justification of his position, twenty-eight of them theological and the other twelve philosophical. In the explanation to thesis 21, he argues that the cross is a good thing, since it destructs (destruuntur; destructus) the good works and thus crucifies old Adam.2 A double work of destruction is thereby indicated: first, a self-centered and inflated (infletur) ego is demolished until it realizes that it is nothing (nihil esse), and second, the speculative metaphysics of scholastic theology is unveiled as a seductive illusion when confronted with the notion of God as crucified in Jesus Christ.

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Chapter Two • Obedience and Disobedience: When Is Which Right?

Chaleff, Ira Berrett-Koehler Publishers ePub

Obedience and Disobedience: When Is Which Right?

“If a man can only obey and not disobey, he is a slave; if he can only disobey and not obey, he is a rebel; he acts out of anger, disappointment, resentment, yet not in the name of a conviction or a principle.”


TO UNDERSTAND APPROPRIATE OBEDIENCE and disobedience, let’s reconsider the scenario in the previous chapter.

We saw the nurse resist what she thought to be a destructive order. Her skillful resistance caused the physician to reflect on his own reasoning and to take a different, presumably safer course. The patient recovered and the story had a happy ending. We know, however, that it could have played out differently.

Was it the success of the patient outcome that made this an act of Intelligent Disobedience as opposed to outright insubordination? Or were there intrinsic factors that made it Intelligent Disobedience, regardless of the outcome? To answer this we need to examine our concepts of obedience and disobedience.

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CHAPTER 4 The Great Transformation and the Legacy of Modernity

Capra, Fritjof Berrett-Koehler Publishers ePub

The brilliant success of Newtonian mechanics and the great prestige of Descartes’s mechanistic worldview led to the gradual emergence of a rational, scientific frame of mind that eventually spread from science, through law, and into the new discipline of economics. This view embodied a critique of the communal life of most individuals—both the urban dwellers, with their guilds and corporations, and the peasants, who lived in village communities. Once bound by duties toward one another, their communities, and their shared environment, people now were defined by their individual property rights. Today, the legacy of the move toward modernity includes an unexamined faith in the concept of individual human rights and in a mechanistic, top-down rule of law, which opened the way for plunder and colonialism and a conception of corporations as “legal persons,” themselves the building blocks of an atomized system.

The 1701 Act of Settlement in England gave birth to the modern idea of the rule of law while also excluding the commons and the political forces that represented them. The Act also illustrated a conflict between medieval and modern conceptions of law and order. Capitalism, aimed at manufacturing, had its origins in privatization, colonization, and plunder. English history shows a systematic attempt to plunder resources in faraway countries, a process that began with the Crusades even before the enclosure movement originated at home. In other words, the taking (to use Locke’s term) has always had both a local and a colonial component.1

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Chapter Seven. Klein’s Departure from the Content but Not the Method of Husserl’s Intentional-Historical Analysis of Modern Science

Burt C. Hopkins Indiana University Press ePub

Klein’s discussion in “Phenomenology and the History of Science” does not “follow Husserl’s pattern” (PHS, 79) in his last works of providing an “ ‘intentional-historical’ analysis of the origin of mathematical physics,” an analysis that for Klein, “although not based upon actual historical research, is on the whole an amazing piece of historical ‘empathy.’ ” Thus, rather than follow Husserl and analyze the foundations of Galileo’s physics by treating “Galileo’s name [as] somewhat of a collective noun, covering a vast and complex historical situation,” Klein tries “to give a general outline of that actual historical development” of mathematical physics. In so doing, he situates his account of this development within the context of his articulation of the significance of Husserl’s late confrontation with the problem of “the relation between intentional history and actual history” (74), and thus within the context of Husserl’s analysis of the “increase of ‘sedimentation’ [that] follows closely the establishment of the new science of nature, as conceived by Galileo and Descartes” (79). By proceeding in this manner, Klein operates on the assumption that Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the problem of “true beginnings” has “adumbrated the aims which should control research in the history of science” (65), an assumption that discloses the understanding of history here as being inseparable from philosophy itself. In addition, Klein’s outline of the actual historical development of mathematical physics also operates on the assumption of the aptness of Husserl’s characterization of the method of historical reflection in the Crisis. This is because, for Husserl, the problem of “sedimentation” emerges from out of the “unique situation” (78) that held sway for him at the time he wrote the Crisis, the situation in which both a particular science and science in general “appear almost devoid of ‘significance.’ ” This method characterizes historical reflection as involving “the ‘zigzag’ back and forth” from the “ ‘breakdown’ situation of our time, with its ‘breakdown of science’ itself,” to the historical “beginnings” of both the original meaning of science itself (i.e., philosophy) and the development of its meaning which leads to the “breakdown” of modern mathematical physics.

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5. The Anthropological Question

Brian Gregor Indiana University Press ePub

Who am I? This is the question of the human being seeking self-understanding. It is also a question the incurved self cannot ultimately answer, because it seeks to answer this question itself through reflection on its own possibilities and acts. In order for the self to be put into the truth about itself, it must be addressed by a word from outside of itself. This external word constitutes the self and opens it toward the future. Following our discussion in chapter 4, we can distinguish between two different ways of relating to the future: (1) According to a conditional word, which establishes a logic of exchange and an ontology of self-justification, or (2) according to a word of promise, which is unconditional and inaugurates an ontology of justification by faith. The latter is the word of the cross, which breaks open the incurved self and sets it free for others.

I begin this chapter by discussing the word of address, taking as my point of departure Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the theme in his inaugural lecture on “The Anthropological Question in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology.” This will lead us to evaluate Bonhoeffer’s critique of Heidegger. Despite Heidegger’s significant contribution to contemporary philosophy and theology (including Bonhoeffer’s own thought), I will argue that Heidegger’s attempt at an ontologia crucis does not provide the best model for thinking about the being of the cruciform self. Instead, I draw on Bonhoeffer’s work in Act and Being, his 1933 Christology lectures, and his Ethics to articulate a more thoroughly cruciform anthropology.

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2 Caves

John Sallis Indiana University Press ePub





There are opposites that are said and opposites that are seen. When opposites that have been said come to be seen, they inevitably prove to be less opposed than they were said to be. The sky above is no mere opposite of the earth below; rather, they are also bound together, encompassing the space in which nearly everything of concern to humans appears. Day and night, determined primarily by the presence or absence of sunlight, not only are bound by their sequential occurrence but also display, each in its own way, a certain play of light. No matter how brilliantly illuminated it may be, no daytime scene is totally without its shadows. Only rarely, if ever, is the night completely dark; and even then, light can always be kindled.

So it is, also, with the relation between the open air, which can be filled with radiant sunlight, and the dark sea, which keeps its depths withdrawn from the light. So it is, to a greater degree, with the relation of the open air to the compact, closed-off earth. In whatever ways they may be bound together, nothing both conjoins and distinguishes them more decisively than their peculiar reception of light. Wherever either extends into the other, there is a site that displays the reception and play of light in an exemplary way.

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47. The Man of Genius

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


The Man of Genius

25 February 1892

The Nation

The Man of Genius. By Cesare Lombroso, Professor of Legal

Medicine in the University of Turin. [The Contemporary Science

Series.] Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891.

Prof. Lombroso comes to us with a proposition not absolutely new, but which he makes claim now to prove for the first time. It is that genius is a mental disease, allied to epileptiform mania and in a lesser degree to the dementia of cranks, or mattoids, as he calls them; so that, far from being a mental perfection, it is a degenerate and diseased condition. The inevitable corollary must be, though Prof. Lombroso does not draw it, that the whole of civilization is due to insanity. If so, it is a disease like pearls, fat livers, and ambergris, which we had better try to propagate, in others. But our Napoleons, our Pythagorases, our Newtons, and our Dantes must no longer run at large, but be confined in

Genius Asylums as fast as they betray themselves.

To prove his proposition, Prof. Lombroso proceeds inductively. In order, therefore, to judge of his work, we will examine the first induction he offers with some care. This first generalization is that geniuses are, on the average, of smaller stature than ordinary men. Here is his reasoning:

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2 Genealogies of Pragmatism

Deborah Whitehead Indiana University Press ePub

From the very beginning, pragmatism has been an essentially contested concept.

Richard Bernstein, “American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives”

“PRAGMATISM IS A RECONSTRUCTION,” John Stuhr has said, a reconstruction of philosophy, experience, and community. As such, it is “piecemeal, multiperspectival, uncertain, and always unfinished”:

As criticism, pragmatism faces forward and identifies itself as the future of philosophy. It is instrumental: a criticism of the present on behalf of possibilities for the future inherent in the present; an inquiry into today in the service of more enduring and extensive values tomorrow. At the same time, as criticism, pragmatism also faces backward and presents itself as the history of the future of philosophy. It is genealogical: a history of the present on behalf of future possibilities that are not inherent or imagined in this present; a detection of the past and its effects in a struggle against today’s supposedly more enduring and extensive values.

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33. Algebra of the Copula [Version 2]

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


Algebra of the Copula

[Version 2]

Spring 1891

Houghton Library

The copula of consequence, R, may be defined as follows: a. If b is true, then a R b is true. b. Either a or a R b is true. g. If a R b and a are true, b is true.

The letters a and b may be replaced by propositions, that replacing a proposition which is the antecedent of another being written in parenthesis. Thus, we shall have the forms following:

With 0 copula:


With 1 copula:

A R B.

With 2 copulas: (A R B ) R C

A R B R C.

With 3 copulas: [(A R B ) R C] R D

(A R B R C ) R D

(A R B ) R C R D

A R (B R C ) R D

A R B R C R D.

With 4 copulas, there are 14 forms; with 5, 42; with 6, 132; etc. The last letter of a proposition is called its consequent; all those which are followed by copulas not under parentheses are called antecedents. In like manner, the propositions under parentheses have consequents and antecedents.

The copula may also be considered as defined by the following two propositions.

PROPOSITION I. If from a proposition, P, a proposition, Q, follows, we may write P R Q.

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Philosophies of Freedom (1928)

LARRY A HICKMAN Indiana University Press ePub

A recent book on Sovereignty concludes a survey of various theories on that subject with the following words: “The career of the notion of sovereignty illustrates the general characteristics of political thinking. The various forms of the notion have been apologies for causes rather than expressions of the disinterested love of knowledge. The notion has meant many things at different times; and the attacks upon it have sprung from widely different sources and been directed toward a multiplicity of goals. The genesis of all political ideas is to be understood in terms of their utility rather than of their truth and falsity.”1 Perhaps the same thing may be said of moral notions; I do not think there is any doubt that freedom is a word applied to many things of varied plumage and that it owes much of its magic to association with a variety of different causes. It has assumed various forms as needs have varied; its “utility” has been its service in helping men deal with many predicaments.

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21. Results of Pendulum Experiments

Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF



Results of Pendulum Experiments

P 168: American Journal of Science and Arts,

3rd ser. 20 (October 1880): 327

The following are the results obtained from observations made by me, for the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, at four important stations, for the purpose of comparing the lengths of the seconds pendulum, together with reductions to the sea-level and to the equator. In making the last reduction I have assumed the ellipticity to be = 1:293, which is the latest result from measurements of arcs.





At station.

At sea-level.

At equator.













The differences of the figures in the last column from OP991, a value conveniently near their mean, when reduced to oscillations per diem are: Hoboken +0?01; Paris +0?58; Berlin -0?59; Kew

H-0?36. The following are the residuals of former observations according to Clarke (Geodesy, p. 349).

New York + 0^20; Paris -3?29; Kew +2?89.

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5. Dialectic of Love

Peter Wake Indiana University Press ePub


Dialectic of Love

The dead body resting there in the interminable decomposition of relics, the spirit never raises itself high enough, it is retained as a kind effluvium, of gas fermenting above the corpse.

—Jacques Derrida, Glas

Beauty as Love Objectified

The beauty found in the beautiful soul is attributed to the subject rather than the social “substance” as a whole. Indeed, it marks a rupture that opens the subjective sphere of interiority.1 For Hegel, the withdrawal characterizing this beauty of the soul is an essential aspect of the figure of Jesus, and the fate of the beautiful soul is that of Christianity in general. This is the figure in whom, as Hegel writes, “the supreme guilt is compatible with supreme innocence; the most wretched fate with elevation above all fate” (W 1:351/SC 236, translation altered). The purging of all hostile feelings, all sense of pride, all demands on another is necessary because the possibility of reconciliation and the rebirth of friendship and love depends on having done no harm to life. The soul that has detached itself from all objectivity is open to reconciliation. Only with the “cancellation” (Auf hebung, ibid.) of the hostile fate that the beautiful soul has brought into being against itself can the possibility of forgiveness arise. As an inevitable transgression against life, the original act that gave rise to the fate subsists, but “only as something past, as a fragment, as a corpse” (W 1:354/SC 239), not, presumably, as a ghost that continues to haunts the conscience. If properly buried, it will not return. Indeed, Hegel speaks of a reconciliation that conquers fate to the point where it is “dissolved into the airs of night” (W 1:351/SC 237), like a wound that heals without a trace.2 By way of forgiveness, “life has severed itself from itself and united itself again” (W 1:354/SC 239). Who participates in forgiveness? The short answer is Mary Magdalene, but a fuller response requires clarifying the proper relations among forgiveness, faith, and withdrawal.

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